

# PATENT SPECIFICATION (11)

1 458 495

1 458 495

- (21) Application No. 17146/75 (22) Filed 25 April 1975 (19)  
 (31) Convention Application No. 483 084 (32) Filed 25 June 1974 in  
 (33) United States of America (US)  
 (44) Complete Specification published 15 Dec. 1976  
 (51) INT. CL.<sup>3</sup> G07F 7/10  
 (52) Index at acceptance



G4H 12D 13D 14A 14B 14D 14G 14X 1A 1B 5A 6A 6B  
 6E 8B 8D 9B2 9B3 9E TG

- (72) Inventors THOMAS GEORGE ANDERSON,  
 WILLIAM ARNOLD BOOTHROYD and RICHARD CARL FREY

## (54) CONTROLLED ACCESS SYSTEMS

(71) We, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, a Corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York in the United States of America, of Armonk, New York 10504, United States of America, do hereby declare the invention, for which we pray that a patent may be granted to us, and the method by which it is to be performed, to be particularly described in and by the following statement:—

This invention relates to controlled access systems.

For reasons of public convenience and economy a variety of systems have been developed for executing user requested transactions. One example is a check cashing machine. Such a machine reads data from a check inserted therein and issues cash equal to the amount of the check if the check is found to be in order. Other systems have been developed for use in conjunction with credit cards.

One credit card system stores credit card account information in a central data base. In response to the submission of an account number from a remote terminal, the system provides information relating to the account. For instance, the system may indicate that the card has expired, this it has been stolen or may indicate the dollar amount of available credit. After a transaction is completed the system properly adjusts the stored information to account for the transaction.

Other credit card systems are frequently used by banks to extend their services during times of heavy business or business closure, permit the issuance of cash or the receipt of deposits through a terminal. Such a terminal typically includes a mechanism for receiving and reading information from a credit card, a keyboard, a display and document entry and exit apertures. The terminal may operate in conjunction with a data base or as a stand alone unit. Increased security for the issuance of cash without human

intervention it attained by issuing a personal ID number with each credit card. A credit card transaction is then enabled only when an ID number corresponding to the account number read from the credit card is entered through the keyboard. This required correspondence prevents a thief or mere finder of a credit card from receiving cash from a terminal. If a terminal operates in conjunction with a data base the correspondence between account numbers and ID numbers can be chosen at random, but frequently the ID number is derivable from the account number in accordance with a predetermined code. This predetermined relationship permits a stand alone terminal to check the ID number by algorithmically relating the ID number to the account number.

While this dual credit card and ID number identification technique improves the security of cash issue terminals, there are still weaknesses that may be exploited to gain access to the large amounts of cash that are stored in the terminals. For instance it may be necessary to employ a substantial number of computer operators, programmers, analysts and other people at the host data base who have at least limited access to information stored in the host data base. It would be possible for any of these people to compile lists of account numbers and corresponding ID numbers to be used in conjunction with forged or stolen credit cards to obtain cash.

An equally serious problem relates to the security of the encryption algorithm for terminals which are capable of stand alone operation. A large number of operators or maintenance personnel are required for the day-to-day support of cash issue terminals. For example, one or two people at each branch bank location may have internal access to the cash issue terminals. Often times these people may have access to the encryption key for normal maintenance. Alternatively, with only a little training these people could learn to acquire the key by

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

measuring electrical signals on the internal circuitry. Once the encryption key is acquired, a correspondence between a large number of account numbers and ID numbers could be generated.

Another possible security problem arises from the transmission of account information and ID information between a terminal and a host data base. These transmissions often involve utility communication lines and are therefore subject to monitoring by a large number of people. Encryption is often used to improve communication security but anyone who is able to break the code or gain access to the code would be able to extract and compile a list of correspondence between credit card account information and ID numbers by monitoring these transmissions. In addition, by generating fake terminal communication traffic a person might gain access to the host data base and fraudulently transfer funds within data base accounts. Thus, while protected against a common thief, conventional systems which use this dual identification technique are not adequately protected against a sophisticated thief having knowledge of modern data processing equipment.

The present invention provides a controlled access system including testing means, a request station incorporating encoding means, a control station incorporating encoding means and a communication system for transmission of data between the request station, the control station and the testing means, the arrangement being such that a request for access includes the entry of two messages at the request station, one of which is encoded at the request station, the other being encoded at the control station, the testing means being arranged to generate an access enabling signal if there is correspondence between the encoded forms of the two messages.

Clearly once right of access is determined, subsequent activity depends on the nature of that to which access is granted.

The invention will be described further by way of example with reference to an embodiment of the invention as illustrated in the accompanying drawings in which:

Figure 1 is a functional block diagram representation of a transaction execution system in accordance with the invention;

Figure 2 is a functional block diagram representation of a transaction terminal used in the transaction execution system shown in Figure 1;

Figure 3 is an operational block diagram representation of the manner in which a user initiated transaction request is initially processed by a transaction terminal;

Figure 4 is an operational block diagram representation of the manner in which transaction requests received by a transaction

terminal are processed by a host data processing system; and

Fig. 5 is an operational block diagram representation of the manner in which a transaction reply message from a host is processed by a transaction terminal.

#### INTRODUCTION

A transaction execution system 10 in accordance with an embodiment of the invention includes a host data processing system 12 and a plurality of user transaction terminals 14 in communication therewith. The host data processing system 12 includes a host central processing unit 16 such as an IBM system 370 (IBM being a Registered Trade Mark), a communication controller 18 such as an IBM 3705 and a data base 20 which may include electrically alterable random access memory, magnetic tape transports, and magnetic disks. The host CPU performs the arithmetic and logical operations which are required for controlling the operation of the host data processing system 12 and processing information which is received through the communication controller 18 or stored in the data base 20. The data base 20 stores information which is related to each customer of the host central processing system 12. For instance, for a banking customer, the data base might store account information for credit card, savings, checking or other accounts of the bank as well as payroll information and information relating to the financial status of the bank's operations. Each account might be typically addressable in accordance with an account number and have stored therein the current account information such as the current balance, a history of account transactions for a predetermined period of time, encoded personal ID numbers for persons who are authorized to use the account, a maximum credit limit, and any other information the bank may wish to store as part of an account. The communication controller 18 acts as an interface between the CPU 16 and a plurality of communication channels 22. The controller 18 arranges information received by the host 16 into a communication discipline and maintains communication synchronization.

A transaction terminal 14 may be connected for communication with the host data processing system 12 in an almost unlimited number of ways with the various methods shown in Fig. 1 being only exemplary. For instance, a terminal may be connected directly to the communication controller 18 by either a local communication link such as cable 24 for local user transaction terminal 26 or a utility or radio link 28 for a remote user transaction terminal 30. Alternatively, a terminal may be connected to the host central processing system 12 through a

controller 32 such as an IBM 3601 by either direct connection to the controller 32 as by cable 34 for terminal 36 or by connection in a communication loop 38. Although other devices may be included, the communication loop 38 is illustrated by way of an example as including a first teller work station 40, a second teller work station 42, a first user transaction terminal 44 and a second user transaction terminal 46. While the communication loop 38 may include remote transmission links such as radio communication or communication over commercial utility lines, for a bank system, the controller 32 might typically be located at a branch bank with all the data processing terminals at the branch bank being connected into the loop 38. The controller 32 is connected to a communication channel 22 of communication controller 18 through a communication link 48 such as a utility communication line as shown in Fig. 1 though it could be connected in a communication loop which extends to a communication channel 22 of communication controller 18. A description of one such communication system may be found in United States Patent Specification No. 3,921,137.

In general, the controller 32 merely acts as a relay device for information which is passed around the loop 38 but may also serve as the host data processing system when immediate, real time communications with the host data processing system 12 are not maintained. When serving as the host, the controller 32 must store transaction execution information for later processing by the system 12 and must provide host support functions which are required for operation of a terminal 14.

#### TRANSACTION EXECUTION TERMINAL

A preferred embodiment of the transaction terminal 14 is shown in Fig. 2. The terminal 14 is generally modular in nature and includes a programmable microprocessor 60 coupled to a plurality of terminal subsystems by an information bus 62. The microprocessor 60 is driven by a clock signal from clock signal generator 64 and is operationally connected to a data storage module 66 providing both electrically alterable random access memory (RAM) and read only storage (ROS). The read only storage portion of the data storage 66 stores the various operating programs for the microprocessor 60. The random access memory portion of data storage module 66 provides a scratchpad for program execution. With typical IC memories the contents of the RAM are lost in the event of a power failure.

#### TERMINAL INFORMATION BUS

The microprocessor 60 communicates with the modular subsystems solely through the

terminal information bus 62. This technique of interconnecting modular subsystems with the microprocessor 60 through the bus 62 permits the microprocessor 60 to receive detailed information on the terminal status and maintain detailed direction of terminal hardware operations without a large number of input and output information connections. The task of sensing terminal status information is performed by the individual terminal subsystems. This information is then transferred to the microprocessor 60 on command from the microprocessor 60. Similarly, the driver circuitry and hardware for executing microprocessor commands is contained within the subsystem modules. The microprocessor commands are extremely basic and detailed in nature. Each command accomplishes a basic subsystem operation such as the activation or deactivation of a motor, the display or printing of a character, the feeding of a bill or the reading of a communication character. The information bus 62 includes a system reset signal, 9 data input signals (8 bits + parity) for carrying information to the processor 60, 9 data output signals (8 bits + parity) for carrying information from the microprocessor 60 to an operable connected subsystem, and bus control signals for controlling the transfer of information onto and off from the bus 62.

#### PROCESSOR SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM

One of the operational subsystems which is connected through bus 62 to microprocessor 60 is processor support subsystem 68. Processor support subsystem 68 provides hardware assistance to the microprocessor 60 in contrast to other terminal subsystems which have functions related to particular aspects of terminal 14 operation.

Processor support subsystem 68 receives a 1 MHz, clock signal from clock signal generator 64 and divides this signal to generate lower frequency clock signals which are used in the other subsystems. One lower frequency clock signal is utilized for the generation of period interrupt commands at 10 msec. intervals. These interrupt commands cause interrupt logic within processor support subsystem 68 to generate a microprocessor interrupt every 10 msec. The microprocessor 60 utilizes these clock period interrupts to maintain an event control time base for the various operations of the terminal 14. Reset logic within subsystem 68 controls the reset line of the information bus 62. Activation of this reset line causes initialization of the processor 60 as well as all modules which are connected to bus 62 and cancels any pending user transaction. The processor 60 is returned to a predetermined program instruction from which program execution can begin anew following the reset. The reset

signal is activated in response to AC power on, a reset switch, or a hang signal from a hang detector within operational hardware subsystem 68. The hang detector monitors the control lines of the bus 62 and generates a hang signal when bus activity ceases for a length of time which is sufficient to indicate that the microprocessor 60 is not operating properly. A run detector responds to the timer interrupt request signals and generates a run signal which is maintained active so long as the microprocessor regularly responds to the requests. If a predetermined period of time elapses without the processing of a timer interrupt request, the run detector terminates the run signal. The processor support subsystem 68 also includes read data logic which receives a string of serial information as it is read from a user credit card, separates the data from the clocking information, deserializes the binary bit stream and places the information on the bus 62 for processing by the microprocessor 60.

#### MECHANICAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM

A mechanical control subsystem 70 provides the actual mechanical manipulation of various hardware features of the terminal 14. Subsystem 70, which like the other subsystems has no branching or decision making capability, executes basic, elemental commands from the microprocessor 60 and collects information on the physical status of the various hardware functions for communication back to microprocessor 60. As an example of the individual elementary nature of functions which are executed by mechanical control subsystem 70, a credit card handler mechanism responds to a credit card direction and move commands to activate a motor which drives a card conveyor system to move the credit card beneath a read head. Sensors (switches or photocells) are positioned to sense the presence of the credit card at (1) entry, (2) exit jam sensor, and (3) card escrow positions. When a sensor is activated an information bit is available in a status word to indicate this condition. When the microprocessor 60 periodically reads the various status words during a read operation is determines that the credit card has reached the escrow area where the card is held. Processor 60 then commands that the credit card feed motor be reversed for a short period of time to "brake", and then commands that the motor be turned off. In similar elemental fashion, the mechanical control subsystem 70 controls the complete processing of the credit card such as retention or return to the user. Other functions include control of the depository wherein the user may deposit documents which are passed into a retention bin in such a manner that the user never has access

to the retention bin. Similarly, the mechanical subsystem 70 controls the opening and closing of user access doors and the issuance of predetermined amounts of cash to an escrow area at which printed transaction statements may also be accumulated along with the cash and the issuance or retention of documents presented to the escrow area. In addition to sensing the status of mechanical hardware which is manipulated by mechanical control system 70, the control subsystem 70 senses the presence of cash stored by the cash issue hardware and indicates when there is not enough cash available to execute a maximum issue transaction. Subsystem 70 also senses several conditions that may be communicated to a remote control panel as well as the processor 60. These remote signals include an indication of whether the service door is opened, whether or not a penetration sensing grid has been disturbed, and whether or not an "intervention required" condition exists. Other signals which may be communicated to the remote panel include transaction statement forms or cash low, operator access service door open, communication between the terminal and host ready. Command switches located on a remote panel may include a terminal reset switch and a wrap switch which commands a test of the communication link.

#### USER COMMUNICATION SUBSYSTEM

A user communication subsystem 72 controls bidirectional communications between the terminal 14 and a user. The communication subsystem 72 includes a keyboard for receiving user generated commands, a display of 222 horizontal dots by 7 dots and includes display control logic and a refresh buffer. The display control logic receives the "dot image" of the particular display and then continues the display until a contrary command is received.

The keyboard is divided into several fields with a plurality of keys in each field. For instance, a transaction selection field indicates the type of transaction a user wishes to execute. Other fields include a from account select field indicating an account from which funds are to be taken, a to account select field indicating an account to which funds are to be deposited and a numeric keyboard field permitting the entry of decimal numbers such as personal ID numbers or dollar amounts. "Back lights" are provided on the function select, to account, and from account keys to generate an audit trail indicating to a user which keys have been selected in previously used fields. All back lights are illuminated in the field in which the next key activation should occur. For instance, as a user inserts his credit card into the terminal 14 he is requested to key in

his personal ID number. After proper receipt of the ID number all of the keys in the function selection field would become lighted. As the user activates a particular key, such as a funds transfer key, the other back lights are extinguished with only the funds transfer key remaining backlighted. All keys in the next field such as the from account field are then illuminated in preparation for the next step in the transaction request. In this way an audit trail is provided to indicate previous selections and the next selection field is also indicated. Display messages and color coding may also be used to guide the user in the proper sequence. The keyboard control logic of the user communication subsystem 72 includes the circuitry necessary to back light specific keys commanded by the microprocessor 60 and to indicate the microprocessor which keys have been activated by a user.

#### TRANSACTION STATEMENT DISPENSER

A transaction statement dispenser subsystem 74 includes a form handler for transporting transaction statement forms, a printer, printer control logic and logic for interfacing the subsystem 74 with subsystem 74 performs only specific, basic commands such as starting movement or printing of specific characters. The subsystem 74 collects information on the physical status of the transaction statement dispenser hardware for communication through bus 62 to the microprocessor 60. This information is then used by the microprocessor 60 which operates under program control to detect the successful completion of a particular elemental function and commands the initiation of additional functions.

#### OPERATOR FUNCTION SUBSYSTEM

An operator function subsystem 76 provides operator maintenance interfacing and includes entry switches, a four digit hexadecimal display, power sense circuitry, a 128 byte power off protected auxiliary memory which is used for storing system parameters and logging exception information. Stored parameters include a cash counter number, encryption keys and a transaction number. Access to the operator panel is through a double locking door at the rear of the terminal 14 which must be closed for user operation. Opening of the access door and attempting a maintenance function causes destruction of encryption keys which are normally stored in this auxiliary memory. This destruction of the keys provides security of the keys from an operator who might seek to use electronic instruments to read the key from the non-volatile memory. The keys must then be re-entered through the keyboard by a person of high trust before the terminal can be reopened. The 8

byte keys are each entered at 16 hexadecimal digits two digits at a time. Only the two preceding digits are displayed as the keys are entered to increase the difficulty of an interloper discovering the keys. Alternatively, a Key A which defines the correspondence between account numbers and personal ID numbers may be even further protected by requiring entry of a de-encrypted Key A (Key A<sup>2</sup>) which is encrypted in accordance with an encryption key to produce the actual Key A. Using this technique the actual Key A can remain secure from all personnel at the physical location of the terminal 14. The power sense circuitry monitors both the AC utility voltage level and the internal DC power levels and in the event of an indication that AC power is lost and the DC voltage levels are low but still usable, a signal is sent to the microprocessor 60 causing critical information to be saved and then access to the auxiliary memory is restricted while the memory is driven from an auxiliary power source. An indication signal is provided to the operator panel so long as the DC logic voltages are adequate.

#### COMMUNICATION SUBSYSTEM

A communication subsystem 78 provides communication interfacing between a communication channel and the information bus 62. Communication subsystem 78 is conventional in nature and receives information from or provides information to terminal information bus 62 one byte at a time.

#### REMOTE CONNECTOR

A remote signal connector 82 permits the connection of some status signals and some control signal inputs to a remote control panel which is actually part of the terminal 14. For instance, a bank branch might have five terminals 14 and a single centralized remote control panel with optical displays and control switches for each of the five terminals 14 at a convenient centralized location. These remote signals are primarily for monitoring terminal operation or control and are not utilized for normal user transaction.

#### COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORMAT

There are essentially two different types of messages which may be sent from a terminal 14 to a host data processing system and four types of messages which may be sent from the data processing system 12 to a transaction terminal 14. The terminal to host message include a transaction request message which is the normal first communication message following a user initiated transaction and a status message which is typically the last of a three message sequence. There are two basic types of status messages. The first is a reply status message

which serves as the third communication message in a normal user transaction sequence and informs the host of the completion or cancellation of a user requested transaction. The second is an exception status message which indicates a status or condition for a terminal 14 other than a normal operating condition. For example, an exception status message would be sent in reply to an inquiry command from the host data processing system, when the service door is opened, upon detection of a serious error condition such as a user door jam or a hard machine failure or any time initialization is required.

The four types of messages which may be transmitted from a host data processing system 12 to a transaction terminal 14 include a transaction reply message, command message, a load initialization message, and an echo message. The transaction reply message is the normal response to a transaction request message during the course of a normal user transaction and informs the terminal 14 of the manner in which the requested transaction should be completed. A command message commands changes in a terminal 14 logical state and may also serve as an inquiry for a status message if no changes are desired. A load initialization message is sent from a host to a terminal 14 in response to an exception status message requesting initialization (IPL). The load initialization message contains message text, option selection information, font tables, program routines, and data information for storage in the volatile random access portion of data storage 66 of the microprocessor 60 within a terminal 14. An echo message is used as a diagnostic assurance test and can be sent only when a terminal 14 is in a closed state. The terminal 14 responds to an echo message with an echo message.

There are only three basic message sequences which may be used for the communication of messages between a terminal 14 and a host data processing system 12. A single message sequence consists of an exception status message transmitted from a terminal 14 to a data processing system 12. The exception status message may either indicate that an abnormal condition has occurred or be a request for initialization. A "command message" from the host is not required. The message contents indicate which is the case.

A two message sequence may include either a command message (a load initialization message) from host processing system 12 to a terminal 14 followed by an appropriate status message from the terminal 14 to the host data processing system 12 or a host echo message followed by a terminal echo message. The transaction terminal 14

will reject a command that is received while the terminal is processing a previous command, an unintelligible message, or an unrequested transaction reply message. In each instance the host may be either a remote system or a directly connected local system.

Each time the terminal 14 assumes an initial power on condition, for whatever reason, the terminal 14 must request and receive a load initialization message from the host data processing system before the terminal 14 can be reopened to accept transactions. Transactions terminals such as terminals 36, 44, and 46 in Fig. 1, which are connected to a controller 32 may operate in an off-line mode. Under such circumstances, the controller 32 serves as the host data processing system and merely records user transactions, for example on magnetic tape or disc. The transaction information is then made available to a transaction accounting system at a later time to permit the updating of accounts. If operating on-line mode, some host functions may be handled by the controller 32 such as storage of the initialization program for the terminals, but normally all communications are merely communicated to the host data processing system 12 without change. In such an on-line mode of operation, the host data processing system 12 may update account records stored in its data base in real time; that is as user requested transactions are executed.

Each time a terminal 14 loses power information is lost from the RAM portion of data storage 66, and initialization must be requested at power turn-on. After the receipt of initialization information from the host a terminal 14 may be opened to receive user transactions, but only on command from the host. Initialization is accomplished by a terminal 14 using the single message format to send an exception status message requesting initialization. The host data processing system then initiates a new communication sequence by sending an initialization message (in multiple parts) containing the requested initialization information. Upon successfully receiving the initialization information the requesting terminal 14 completes the two part message sequence by sending a status message back to the host data processing system.

Every message which is sent between a transaction terminal 14 and a host data processing system 12 begins with a four byte header field. Byte 1 of the header field is a message length byte (L) containing a binary count of the number of message bytes in the message text (including L). Byte 2 is a 1 byte transaction sequence number (N) in binary form. This number is incremented for each new user transaction and is included in all

messages exchanged for that transaction. The number has a range of 1 to 255 inclusive. Zero (hex 00) is used for messages that do not relate to a user transaction. Thus, a transaction number counter which is incremented for each new user transaction overflows from hex FF to hex 01. The transaction number (N) is stored in the power out protected auxiliary memory of operator function sub-system 76 so that it remains available after a short term power outage. Byte 3 of the common header field is a class byte (C) which identifies the type of message and thus the format of the message which is being sent. Byte 4 is the final byte of the header field and identifies a message sub-class (SC) which serves as a modifier to the message class byte.

Only a few of the possible combinations of message classes (C) and sub-classes (SC) are actually implemented. Class hex 01 identifies a transaction request message from a terminal 14 to a host data processing system. Within class 01, nine sub-classes have been implemented. Sub-class hex 00 indicates that a user requested transaction is incomplete because the ID number has not been properly entered. Sub-class hex 01 indicates a cash issue request. Sub-class hex 02 indicates an account inquiry. Sub-class hex 03 indicates that a user is requesting to deposit funds. Sub-class hex 04 indicates that a user is requesting to transfer funds from one account to another. Sub-class hex 05 indicates that a user is requesting to pay a loan or bill by depositing money in the transaction terminal. Sub-class hex 06 indicates a transaction wherein the nature of the transaction is identified by entry of a predetermined number through the keyboard rather than by activation of a single key in the transaction selection field of the keyboard. Sub-class hex 07 indicates that a requested transaction is incomplete because the deposit flap covering the deposit bin has been jimmied. Sub-class hex 08 indicates a user request to pay a bill or loan by the transfer of funds from one account to another.

A class of message designated C=hex 15 identifies a status message from a terminal 14 a host data processing system 12. There are five sub-classes of messages under this class. Sub-class hex 01 indicates a transaction completion status message. Sub-class hex 02 indicates that the message is in response to the execution of a command and the status number, N, in the common header must be set to 0. Sub-class hex 03 is an exception status message indicating an error condition or requesting initialization and the transaction number N must be set to 0. Sub-class hex 04 indicates that the status message is in response to initialization and the transaction number N must be set to 0. Sub-

class hex 08 is a recovery request or command response message and the transaction number N must be set to 0 for this message. A recovery request indicates that the host has lost track of the current transaction and requires an update. The terminal responds with an exception status message.

A transaction reply message from a host data processing system to a transaction terminal 14 is indicated by class hex 0B. There are nine sub-classes indicated by the sub-class byte under this sub-class. Sub-class hex 00 indicates that the transaction is incomplete because the ID number was not properly entered. Sub-class hex 01 indicates a cash issue transaction request. Sub-class hex 02 indicates an account inquiry transaction request. Sub-class hex 03 indicates a deposit transaction request. Sub-class hex 04 indicates a funds transfer transaction request in which funds are to be transferred from one account to another. Sub-class hex 05 indicates a transaction request for the payment of a loan or bill by transfer of funds deposited in the terminal to an account. Sub-class hex 06 indicates an optional selection transaction wherein the nature of the transaction is determined in accordance with a number entered through the numerical keyboard rather than by the activation of a single key in the transaction selection field of the user keyboard. Sub-class hex 07 indicates that the message relates to a requested user transaction which is incomplete because the deposit flap of the terminal 14 has been jimmied. Sub-class hex 08 indicates a user transaction wherein a loan or bill is to be paid by transferring funds from one account to another.

Class hex 0C identifies a command message from the host data processing system to a terminal 14. A command message does not relate to a particular transaction and therefore the transaction number N of the header field is always set to 0. Sub-class hex 01 indicates an open command. Sub-class hex 02 indicates a command to close the transaction terminal 14. Sub-class hex 03 indicates an inquiry type of message in which a transaction terminal 14 may not perform any function in response to the command but must respond with a status message. Sub-class hex 04 indicates a command to change the third key (key B) which is the transmission encryption key from the present key to a key contained within the message. Sub-class 05 indicates a command to set the transmission encryption key (key B) using a back up key (key C). Sub-class hex 06 indicates that a transaction terminal 14 is commanded to request an initial program load. Sub-class hex 07 indicates that the message includes a command to either change the optical display or contains a written message to be printed by the transac-



tion statement dispenser. Sub-class hex 08 is a command for transaction terminal 14 to send a class hex 15 sub-class hex 08 recovery request message back to the host.

5 The load initial program message from the host to a transaction terminal is designated class hex 0D and has only one sub-class which is designated hex 01.

10 An echo message from the host data processing system to a terminal 14 is designated by class hex 10. Within this class there are four sub-classes of echo messages. Sub-class hex 00 is the basic echo message and merely commands the transaction terminal 14 to retransmit the echo message back to the host data processing system. Sub-class hex 01 indicates an echo canned message command which is both checked for bit pattern and echoed. The bytes of data in the canned text are designed to send all possible bit patterns to check the operation of communication facilities. The message pattern is retained by the terminal for comparison with a second transmission of the message pattern. An echo variable record sub-class designated hex 02 is similar to the canned echo sub-class except that the message may contain host entered data. The transaction terminal echos the message back and also retains the message in storage for comparison with a second transmission of the same message. Upon receipt of the second transmission of the message, the transaction terminal checks and echoes as for sub-class 01. A log data request message is designated sub-class 03. This will cause the terminal to send the 8 most current error log records. No encryption or decryption is involved in the transmission of any echo message.

40 The four byte common header field of each message is followed by the message data in a format that depends upon the particular type of message that is being sent. For a transaction request message from the terminal 14 to the host data processing system bytes 1—4 of the common header are followed by bytes 5—8 which contain a 32 bit encrypted field. This 32 bit encrypted field will be discussed in greater detail later, but in general the field includes an encrypted form of the personal ID number which was entered through the user keyboard and one byte of varying information which may be either the contents of a cash counter or a transaction number counter.

55 Byte 9 is a from account select (FAS) byte indicating which key within from account selection field of the user keyboard was activated. The data content of this ninth byte indicates the type of account from which the funds for the user requested transaction are to be taken. Hex 21 indicates from a checking account, hex 22 indicates from a savings account, hex 23

indicates from a credit card account, and hex 24 indicates from an optional selection account, which is further defined by a numeric modifier. By making special arrangements with the bank, a user can open multiple accounts. These accounts can then be assigned predetermined three digit (decimal) numbers. By activating the optional selection from account key on the keyboard the user is then permitted to enter up to three decimal numbers through the numerical keyboard to indicate which of possibly many predefined accounts he wants debited. This account identification number is transmitted one digit per byte and bytes 10-A where A may assume the values 10, 11 or 12 depending on whether the keyboard determined account number contains 1, 2 or 3 digits respectively. Because the FAS field may have a variable length, it must be followed by a field separator (FS) byte having the data content hex FE, which is used to define the limits of variable length fields. Adjacent field separators indicate a zero length of no entry field between them. The FS byte delimits the end of the field preceding the FS byte.

Following the FS byte for the from account select (FAS) field is a to account select (TAS) field designating an activated key within the to account select field of the user keyboard. Hex 31 indicates that funds are to be deposited to a checking account, hex 32 indicates to a savings account, hex 33 indicates to a credit card account, and hex 34 indicates to an optional selection to account select key which may be modified by up to three digits (decimal) immediately following the first TAS byte. These numeric modifiers have the same meaning in the TAS field as in the FAS field. Because the TAS field is variable in length it must also be followed by a field separator (FS) byte having data content hex FE. Following the field separator byte for the to account select field, the data which is read from the magnetic stripe on the credit card is transmitted. By removing the parity bit from the standardized code of the American Bankers Association, it is possible to pack the two four bit characters of credit card data in each byte of the message. In the event that an odd number of credit card characters appears on the credit card, the last byte is padded with a hex F to fill all bytes of the message. Start of card characters, end of card characters and longitudinal redundancy check (LRC) characters are excluded from the transmitted transaction request message in as much as they are checked by the terminal 14.

A status message from a terminal 14 to the host data processing system begins with the four byte common header field identifying the message length (L), transaction number (N), message class (C), and message



sub-class (SC) for the message, in byte positions 1—4. Byte positions 5—8 contain a 32 bit encrypted field. This 32 bit field will be discussed in greater detail below but in general contains a repetition of the eight bit transaction number (N), eight bits representing the revolving cash count for denomination two (CNTR2), eight bits indicating the number of status bytes (CB) and eight bits representing the revolving cash count for denomination one (CNTR1). The byte CB is a one byte field containing a binary count of a number of status and inquiry data bytes which follow the encrypted portion (bytes 5—8) of the message for a normal status message. For a "request recovery message" the CB field contains the "action field" from the transaction reply for the last transaction request message. The "action" field is an eight bit field transmitted as part of the 32 bit encrypted field of a transaction reply message. The eight bit counter portions (CNTR) of the 32 bit encrypted field indicates binary count of bills issued by the second and first cash issue mechanism. These numbers are taken from counters which are incremented for each issued bill and roll over from hex FF to hex 00. The counts are stored in the auxiliary memory of the operator function subsystem 76 so that the count is preserved during a short term power outage. Following the 32 bit encrypted field at bytes 5 to 8 is a data field. The data field includes a four byte status field in byte positions 9—12. These four bytes define the current status of a terminal 14 as discussed below. Most status messages terminate with an FS byte at byte position 13. However, a status message which is sent in response to an inquiry command message contains 112 of the 128 bytes stored in the auxiliary memory of the operator function subsystem 76 which are transmitted behind the four status bytes. For this message the field CB would contain the number 116. The 16 bytes of the non-volatile memory which are not sent in response to an inquiry message contain the two eight byte encryption keys. If the status message is being resent in response to a request recovery message, the four status bytes contain the four bytes of the last transaction status message and are followed by the complete original transaction request message. This information then would allow the host to re-construct the conditions which existed prior to the event which caused the host to request recovery. The 32 bit positions of the four status bytes at byte positions 9—12 of a status message each have a predetermined meaning. These meanings are assigned to define the physical and operating status of a terminal 14 with sufficient particularity that a host data processing system can assess and

control the general operation of each terminal 14. These meanings are described in tabular form below with the number to the left indicating the status byte number ranging from 0 to 3 with status byte 0 in status message byte position 9 and status byte 3 in status message byte position 12. For each status byte there are 8 bits designated bit 0—bit 7 with bit 0 being in the most significant bit position and bit 7 in the least significant bit position.

Byte	Bit	Description	
0	0	Transaction completion status bit. This bit position is set to logic 1 at the beginning of each transaction to indicate that the transaction has not been completed because a transaction reply message is required. The bit position is reset to logic 0 when a transaction has been executed as specified in a transaction reply message.	80
0	1	Invalid transaction sequence number in transaction reply bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 each time a new transaction is started. The bit position is set to logic 1 any time the transaction number (N) within the common header field of a message received from the host data processing system is inaccurate. An exception is made for an echo message which does not convey meaningful information in the transaction number position of the header field.	85 90 95 100 105
0	2	Invalid transaction subclass in reply message bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 each time a new transaction is started and is set to logic 1 any time a transaction reply message is received containing a different number in the fourth or subclass byte of the common header field from that of the transaction request message. Byte 0 bit 0 must be set simultaneously with this bit position.	110 115 120
0	3	Invalid class bit. This bit position is reset to 0 after an exception status message has been sent and is set to logic 1 any time a message is received from the host data processing system containing an invalid class designation in	125 130

Byte	Bit	Description	Byte	Bit	Description		
5		byte 3 of the common header field. As an example, a terminal 14 might receive a nonrequested initialization (IPL) message or a nonrequested transaction reply message.			display command without a new display field. This bit position is also set to logic 1 in response to a command message containing an invalid subclass designation in byte 4 of the common header field.	70	
10	0	4	Amount error in transaction reply message bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 at the beginning of each new transaction and set to logic 1 any time a transaction reply message is received with the dollar amount byte within the encrypted field thereof indicating an improper dollar amount. Bit 0 of byte 0 must be set to logic 1 any time this bit position is set to logic 1.	1	2	IPL request bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 upon the proper receipt of a load initialization message from the host data processing system and set to logic 1 each time a terminal 14 goes from a closed to an open condition, for example, upon closure of the operator/customer engineer access panel, or upon command from the host data processing system. This bit is also set to logic 1 each time a terminal 14 receives a command message commanding the terminal to request an IPL.	75
15						80	
20						85	
	0	5	Unassigned.				
25	0	6	Customer cancelled transaction bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 at the beginning of each new transaction and set to logic 1 in the event that a customer activates a cancelled key on the user keyboard subsequent to the transmission of the transaction of a transaction request message.	1	3	IPL and process bit. This bit position serves as a modifier bit for bit position 2 of byte 1. A combination of bit 2, bit 3 equal 00 indicates that the terminal is initialized. This condition can occur only when the terminal is in an open state. The combination of bit 2, 3 equal 10 indicates that initialization has been requested but the load initialization message has not been received. A combination of bit 2, 3 equal 11 indicates that a load initialization is in process.	90
30						95	
35	0	7	User timeout bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 at the beginning of each new user transaction and set to logic 1 any time a user consumes more than an allotted predetermined length of time in entering a number through the user keyboard or in depositing materials through the deposit flap. Bit 0 of byte 0 must be set any time this position or position 0 6 is set to logic 1.			100	
40						105	
45				1	4	Cash counter error bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 at the beginning of each new user transaction. The bit position is set to logic 1 any time a transaction reply message is received containing a cash counter byte (CNTR) within the encrypted field thereof which does not match the status of the cash counter within the terminal. The cash counter is a rollover counter which is incremented each time a new bill is issued. Byte 0, bit 0 must be set to logic 1 each time this bit position is set to logic 1.	110
	1	0	Command reject bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 after a command status message is sent. The bit position is set to logic 1 upon receipt of a command message which cannot be executed because the terminal 14 is busy at the time a command is received.			115	
50						120	
55						125	
	1	1	Invalid command bit. This bit position is reset to logic 1 upon sending a command status message. The bit position is set to logic 1 any time a command message is received with missing fields therein. For instance, a key change command which does not include the new key or a change	1	5	C and CS field error bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 upon sending an exception status message. It is set to logic 1 upon receipt of a command message	130
60							
65							

Byte Bit Description		Byte Bit Description	
5		2 1	Dispense error bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 at the beginning of each new user transaction. The bit position is set to logic 1 any time an error occurs during the dispensing of a document such as a bill or a transaction statement. This bit position is set any time a document is dumped from an escrow area into a retention bin. Since the transaction may be completed upon retry, this bit position does not necessarily indicate an incomplete user transaction.
10			70
15			75
20	1 6	2 2	Unrecoverable depository error bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 at the beginning of each new user transaction. This bit position is set to logic 1 any time an error condition such as a jam occurs in the terminal depository and the terminal is unable to recover from the error condition.
25			85
30		2 3	Display table overflow bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 upon sending a status message. The bit position is set to logic 1 upon receipt of a change display command message from the host data processing system containing more display data than the terminal display system can handle. An improper display message is not accepted by a terminal 14.
35	1 7		95
40			100
45		2 4	Unassigned.
50		2 5	Unassigned.
55		2 6	Intervention required bit. This bit is set when an intervention required condition occurs. It is reset when the intervention required indicator is turned off.
60			105
65		2 7	Card removal timeout bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 at the beginning of each new user transaction. The bit position is set to logic 1 whenever a predetermined period of time expires following the availability of credit card to a user without the card being removed from a terminal 14. This bit position indicates that some kind of intervention is required. Normally, the host data processing system would respond by commanding the terminal to retain the credit card.
	2 0		110
			115
			120
			125
			130

Byte	Bit	Description	Byte	Bit	Description	
5	3 0	Open/close bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 any time the terminal opens and is ready to receive a user transaction request. This bit position is set to logic 1 each time the terminal closes.			other error condition is encountered which cannot be corrected, whether during the execution of a transaction or at any other time. Setting of this bit position indicates that intervention is required and the terminal closes.	70
10	3 1	Cash out condition bit. This bit position is reset at the beginning of each new user transaction. This bit position is responsive to a hardware switch which indicates whether or not there is enough cash stored in the terminal to execute a maximum cash issue transaction. The bit position is set to logic 1 any time the cash out condition occurs during the execution of a preceding cash issue transaction to which the status message corresponds. The setting of this bit position indicates that intervention is required and causes a terminal to close.	3 6	Customer door open bit. This bit position is reset to logic 1 upon sending a status message. The bit position is set to logic 1 when the customer door which provides access to the user keyboard and display is open when it should be closed and indicates that the door has been jimmied. Setting of this bit indicates that intervention is required and causes the terminal to close.		75
15						80
20						85
25			3 7	Security enclosure interlock bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 when the operator access door is closed and set to logic 1 when the door is open. The terminal 14 closes any time this bit position is set to logic 1.		90
30	3 2	Invalid backup encryption key bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 upon sending a status message and is set to logic 1 upon receipt of a change key type of command message from the host data processing system containing an improper encryption key (an improper encryption key contains all zeros).				95
35						100
40	3 3	Transaction statement dispenser form out bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 at the beginning of each new user transaction. It is set to logic 1 when a transaction statement sensor indicates that the last usable transaction statement form is issued during the last preceding transaction to which the status message corresponds.				105
45						110
50						115
55	3 4	Deposit flap (door) or issue gate open bit. This bit position is reset upon sending a status message. The bit position is set to logic 1 when the deposit flap or issue gate remains open when it should be closed and indicates that the flap or gate has been jimmied.				120
60						125
65	3 5	Unrecoverable hardware failure bit. This bit position is reset to logic 0 after an exception status message has been set. This position is set to logic 1 any time a jam or				130

A transaction reply message from a host data processing system 12 to a user terminal 14 is generated in response to a user transaction request message. The transaction reply message begins with the standard four byte common header field specifying total message length (L), transaction number (N), message class (C), and message subclass (SC). Following the four bytes of the common header field are four bytes or 32 bits of encrypted information, a variable length optional display data field, a field separator character (FS) and a variable length optional transaction statement print field, and a final field separation character (FS). The four byte encrypted field includes a one byte cash counter 2 number (CNTR 2), a single action byte, a one byte cash counter 1 number (CNTR 1), and an amount byte (AMT) which specifies the number of bills for which the reply message is authorizing issuance. The terminal 14 checks this authorized amount against the request.

The action byte is a one byte instruction from the host data processing system 12 which directs a terminal 14 to consummate a user transaction in a manner consistent with the data contents thereof.

Bit 0. When bit 0 is set to logic 1, a terminal 14 is commanded to immediately display a standard terminal display message which is indicated by the optional display data field immediately following the en-

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

105

110

115

120

125

130

- crypted field. Up to 128 separate messages designated 0—127 are stored in data storage 66 associated with the microprocessor 60. When bit 0 of the action byte is set to logic 1 the terminal 14 is commanded to display one of these messages which is indicated by the binary content of the one byte optional display field at byte position 9 of the transaction reply message.
- Bit 1. When bit 1 is at logic one terminal 14 is commanded to immediately display an optional display message contained within the optional display data field immediately following the encrypted field. When bit 1 is set to logic one, byte 9 at the beginning of the optional display data field contains a binary number indicating the length of the display message in bytes exclusive of byte 9. Immediately following byte 9 the transaction reply message contains the text of the desired display message in EBCDIC code with each byte indicating one display character.
- Bit 2. A logic one at bit position two of the action byte indicates that a transaction terminal 14 is commanded to print information on a transaction statement and that the transaction statement print data field of the reply message contains the data to be printed in EBCDIC code.
- Bit 3 not defined.
- Bit 4. A logic one in bit 4 indicates that a requested user transaction is authorized as requested.
- Bit 5. A logic one in this bit position indicates that a user's credit card is to be retained by the terminal 14 while a logic 0 indicates that the credit card is to be returned to the user.
- Bit 6. A logic one in this bit position indicates that the user is required to acknowledge the transaction before the terminal 14 proceeds to execute the transaction. The user acknowledges the transaction by activating either a cancel key or a proceed key in a keyboard control field. Typically some indication of the transaction would be displayed at the time the user selects a key. For instance the message "TRANSFER \$50.00 FROM SAVINGS ACCOUNT TO CHECKING ACCOUNT—depress cancel or proceed" might be displayed.
- Bit 7. Not defined.
- The transaction statement print field at the end of a transaction reply message is divided into a plurality of subfields which permit the communication of print data for up to 2 transaction statement forms. The first subfield is a common data subfield which carries information such as the user's name and account number which will be the same for both transaction statements. The common data field may either command a terminal 14 to print a canned print message stored within the memory 66 of a terminal 14 or may command the terminal to print a message transmitted as part of the common data field and standard EBCDIC code. The first byte of the common data field determines the source of the print data. If this byte contains a number from 1 to 127 (below hex 80) the print data is contained in standard EBCDIC form in the common data subfield immediately subsequent to the first byte. In this instance, the first byte represents a binary length count indicating the number of bytes of text in the common data field exclusive of the length byte. If the common print data is to be provided by a canned message, a print message ID number identifying the particular canned message is added to 128 (hex 80) and transmitted as the first and only byte of the common data subfield. By way of example, if the common data is to be taken from a canned message number 30, the one byte common data subfield would contain the binary number  $30 + 128 = 158$  (hex 9E). A one byte data content corresponding to ID number 0 (hex 80) is used as a delimiter for the common data and statement data and must not be used to define message  $\phi$  as a canned message. A statement number one data subfield immediately follows a delimiter byte hex 80 after the common data subfield. The statement number one data subfield may carry an actual EBCDIC print message or may identify a canned print message and uses the same format as the common data subfield. Print information commanded by the statement number one data subfield, however, will be printed only on one transaction statement form designated form one. The delimiter character (hex 80) immediately follows the statement number one data subfield. A statement number two data subfield immediately follows the second delimiter character. The statement number two data subfield has a format and data content similar to the common data subfield and statement number one data subfield. The statement number two data subfield may contain either a transmitted print message in EBCDIC code or identify a canned print message. If the statement number two data subfield is not present, i.e. has a length of 0 byte, a second transaction statement form is neither printed nor issued. A field separator character (FS) immediately follows the statement number two data subfield to indicate the end of the transaction statement print field and the end of a transaction reply message. Printing of a transaction statement form begins in the upper left hand corner and proceeds left to right and line by line in the common English reading format. An EBCDIC carriage control code is utilized to terminate a line of text and begin the printing of the next textual character at the left most character position of the

next line down. The printing operation follows a predetermined sequence in which common text is first printed on statement form one, statement one text is printed on statement form one, common text is printed on statement form two, and finally statement two text is printed on statement form two.

A command message is sent from the host data processing system 12 to a terminal 14 to control the operation or status of the terminal in accordance with the data content of the command message. Each command message begins with a four byte common header field and containing message length (L), transaction number (N), message class (C) and message subclass (SC). A four byte encrypted field follows the four byte header field. The four byte encrypted field includes the cash counter byte (CNTR1), the class and subclass byte (CNSC) containing both the class and subclass indication combined into a single byte, a second cash counter byte (CNTR2), and a special byte (SPEC). The special byte is utilized for an inquiry type of command message to indicate the information which is to be supplied by a responsive status message from a commanded terminal to the host data processing system. Bits 0-4 of the special byte are unassigned and are normally transmitted as logic 0. Bit 5 is set to logic one to indicate that a terminal is being commanded to retransmit its last status message. Bit 6 is set to logic one to indicate that the terminal is to transmit a current status message plus the 112 bytes of auxiliary storage within operator function subsystem 76 which do not contain the two encryption keys. A logic one in bit 7 of the special byte indicates that the terminal is commanded to transmit a normal status message. Bits 5, 6 and 7 are mutually exclusive where only one should be on at a time.

Two optional encrypted fields follow the common header field and four byte encrypted field of a command message. The first optional encrypted field carries a first half of an eight byte encryption key and the second optional encrypted field carries the second half of an eight byte encryption key. These first and second optional encrypted fields are included only following a set key or change key command. A terminal 14 responds to a change key command by decrypting the command message with the old third or transmission encryption key (key B) and then substituting the key received in the optional encrypted fields one and two for all future communications. A set key command operates like a change key command except that the new key is encrypted in a backup key (key C) stored in the auxiliary memory. In a "change display message" type of command message the

two optional encrypted fields are not included in the message but a clear text optional data field follows the four byte encrypted field. The clear text optional data field begins with an index number (INDX) followed by a data field length byte (LD) and new display text in standard EBCDIC code. A "change display message" type of command message does not affect the actual display which is visible by a terminal user, but instead modifies the data content of a canned display message stored within the data storage 66. For example it may be desirable to change a canned display message "take out credit card" having a display message ID number 40 to "remove credit card". The index byte (INDX) contains the display message ID number of the canned message which is to be changed. The data field length byte (LD) contains a binary number indicating the number of bytes in the text of the new message which immediately follows. If the new message is too long to fit into the number of bytes available in the table of display messages within data storage 66, the command is not executed and the following status message indicates that the command was not executed. Because the display messages are of a variable length and because it is necessary for all messages from the host data processing system to a terminal 14 to contain an even number of bytes, it may be necessary to pad the end of a display text with an arbitrary pad character. This pad character would not be counted for the data field length byte (LD) but would be counted for the overall message length byte (L) in the common header field of the command message.

The load initialization message provides the information for the random access memory portion of data storage 66 which may have been lost in the event of a power shut down. It may also be used to reinitialize the terminal with new options. This message begins with the standard four byte common header field, followed by a two byte binary number field specifying the number of bytes in the following data field. The data field comprises the last field of the load initialization message and contains the customization image which is stored in data storage 66. The critical information such as micro program routines and option selection bytes in the data field is encrypted with the third transmission key (key B) in four byte sequential segments.

In general, the customization image which is received during initialization provides the information which may vary from one terminal to another and is therefore not readily implemented with read only memories. Included within the customization image are the canned user display and print messages which may include up to 49 predetermined

messages designated message 1—49. Also included as message 50 is an optional font table containing up to 574 bytes which permits the display of non-standard characters or graphics which have been custom selected by a given terminal customer such as a bank. Also included in the customization image is a certain amount of programming and program control information to account for the particular combination of available options which is implemented with a given terminal.

#### TRANSACTION MESSAGE ASSEMBLY

The communications which are involved between a host data processing system 12 and a user transaction terminal 14 during the execution of a requested user transaction are illustrated in further detail in the operational block diagrams of Figs. 3—5 to which reference is now made. In order to facilitate an understanding of the operation of the invention, the operative communication system will be described in the context of specific user transaction examples. It should be appreciated however, that a transaction terminal 14 may perform any one of a large variety of user requested transactions and is not limited to these specific examples.

For a specific example it will be assumed that the terminal 14 is a through the wall terminal providing a walk up station at a branch bank. The through the wall terminal will be assumed to be connected in a manner similar to terminal 46 (Fig. 1) in a loop to a controller 32 and through the controller 32 to a host data processing system 12. The terminal 46 extends through an exterior wall of the branch bank with the user communication facilities outside the bank and the majority of the terminal inside the bank. The operator maintenance access panel is accessible via the service door from the interior of the branch bank. As a potential user approaches the terminal 46 the illumination of the keyboard area and a sign on the face of the terminal indicates that the terminal is in an available (open) condition. No light and a "closed" display indicate that the terminal is unavailable for the execution of transaction if the terminal is in a closed condition and any user action is ignored. If the terminal indicates an open condition, the prospective user initiates a user transaction by inserting his credit card into a slot. In this example, it will be assumed that a user desires to transfer funds from his savings account to his checking account.

#### 1. TRANSACTION REQUEST MESSAGE

The first portion of the three part user transaction communication sequence is illustrated in Fig. 3. The terminal microprocessor 60 is shown only generally in Fig. 3 with no specific connections being made to physical

or functional blocks. It will be appreciated that logical interconnection are as shown in Fig. 2 and that operational control and data processing are performed by the program microprocessor 60.

At the time the prospective user is issued a credit card 100 by the customer bank, he is also assigned a six digit personal identification (ID) number. This personal ID number may optionally be related to information recorded on a stripe of magnetic material on the credit card 100. As the card 100 is inserted into the terminal 46 the presence of the card is sensed and a credit card transport mechanism draws the card into the terminal 14 and past a read head where the card is sensed for proper orientation and status. If the card is improperly oriented contains unreadable data, or of a type which cannot be accepted by the terminal 46 it is returned. (If the card is expired it may be retained upon host command.) Assuming a proper credit card, the card 100 is transported past a card reader 102 where the information on the magnetic stripe is read and stored in the random access portion of data storage 66 and the card is detained at a card escrow holding area. The credit card 100 is compatible with standards set forth by the American Bankers Association. This means that the magnetic stripe contains a sequence of five bit words representing a parity bit and four data bits. The four data bits include a start of card (SOC) character, a field separator character and an end of card (EOC) character. Numerals are indicated in binary coded decimal representation. A typical magnetic stripe format begins with a start of card (SOC) character followed by an account number of up to 19 characters, a field separator character, four characters specifying a month and year of the credit card expiration date, a discretionary data field, an end of card (EOC) character and a longitudinal redundancy check character. A maximum of 40-5 bit characters may be recorded on the magnetic stripe. As the characters are read a selection key designated k1 which is provided as an initialization option determines a starting point for selecting 8 sequential characters from the magnetic stripe. For example, if k1 contains the number 5, the fifth through 13 characters following SOC are selected at step 104 without their parity bits to form 32 bits. These 32 bits are processed in an encryption algorithm 106 to generate 32 bits of encrypted data.

The comparison of part or all of a personal ID number with corresponding credit card information may be selectively provided as a customer option which is indicated at the time of initialization. If the comparison option is not selected the correspondence between ID numbers and credit card in-



formation may be randomly selected. However, the execution of a correspondence comparison is then impossible if the terminal 14 operates under control of an off line host. If the local check option is selected, two keys indicate the manner in which the check is executed.

The first check key, k1, permits the selection of any contiguous group of 8 characters read from the credit card. Key k1 identifies the position following SOC of the first of the 8 characters. The 8 characters would typically, but not necessarily, be chosen to be entirely within the credit card account number field. In the present example K1=5 causing characters 5-13 to be selected.

The second check key, K2, determines which digits within the personal ID number are to be checked by indicating the digit position at which the check is to begin. Thus, k2=1 would cause digits 1-6 to be checked, k2=4 would cause digits 4-6 to be checked and k2=6 would cause only the least significant digit to be checked. As the number of checked digits increases (i.e. k2 smaller), the protection against fraud by guessing at ID numbers is increased for off line host operation. However, the locally checked digits must have a predetermined correspondence with credit card information while non-checked digits may have a random correspondence. Increasing the number of locally checked digits thus decreases the number of digits available for random correspondence and increases the opportunity for access to the data base of an on line host in the event that the correspondence algorithm and encryption key becomes compromised. For the present example it is assumed that the customer has exercised his option by selecting the local check feature with k2=4.

The particular encryption algorithm which determines the correspondence between ID numbers and credit card information is not critical to the practice of this invention except that the relationship between the clear text input and encrypted text output should be dependent upon an encryption key designated here the first encryption key, Key A. For the purpose of this example it will be assumed that the encryption algorithm is of the type designated Lucifer in an article, H. Feistel, "Cryptography and Computer Privacy", *Scientific American*, May 1973, pp. 15-23 or in an article, C. H. Meyer, "Enciphering Data for Secure Transmission", *Computer Design*, April 1974, pp. 129-134. An encryption key such as Key A, for the algorithm 106, is a word containing 64 binary digits. The encryption key can also be thought of as including 8-8 bit bytes. Key 8 is stored within the auxiliary memory portion of operator function sub-

system 76 and occupies 8 of the 128 memory words therein. In order to provide complete protection for this key, the key is destroyed each time a maintenance function from the customer interface panel is requested. This destruction prevents an ordinary terminal maintenance person from gaining access to the code. In one arrangement a trusted bank employee having access to Key A waits until the maintenance person completes terminal maintenance and then enters the 64 bit code as 8 sequentially entered hexadecimal digit pairs. An operator panel hexadecimal display indicates entered digits to permit correction if necessary with only the two most recently entered digits being displayed at any given time. This restriction of the display to two digits protects the security of the key by requiring a person trying to copy the key by observation of the display to observe the display for a considerable period of time by making it impossible to observe the entire key at one instant as the key entry is completed. Once the key is entered it cannot be again displayed. It is thus possible to directly enter key A into the terminal as described above.

However, in an alternate example the trusted bank employee is given not Key A, but a Key A<sup>1</sup> having a predetermined relationship to Key A. In this example the trusted employee enters Key A<sup>1</sup> into the terminal in the same manner as if he were entering Key A itself. However, the terminal processes Key A<sup>1</sup> with an encryption algorithm 108 which may be similar to or even identical to encryption algorithm 106 to produce the encryption Key A. The encryption algorithm 108 uses a second encryption key designated Key C which is a terminal back up key in the encryption process which converts Key A<sup>1</sup> to Key A. Alternatively, a completely separate key could be loaded at initialization for this purpose.

Because of the predetermined relationship between the 32 bits of credit card data which is encrypted with Key A and the 6 digit personal ID number which is given to a person at a time a card is issued, the security of Key A is extremely important. If a class of credit cards is to be usable at more than one branch of a customer bank, then at least one person at each bank must have access to Key A so that it can be keyed into a terminal 46 when necessary. For a large bank with many branches this distribution can become quite wide. Furthermore, if a card is to be usable interchangeably at more than one bank, all banks accepting the card must have the same encryption Key A. The number of persons having access to Key A is thus further increased and can become quite substantial. The use of encryption algorithm 108 provides security

against this wide distribution of Key A. By using a different Key C at each banking unit only a predetermined Key A<sup>1</sup> corresponding to the given Key C will operate satisfactorily to produce the highly important Key A. For example each unit might be a separate branch bank having three or four of the terminals 14. Only the Key A<sup>1</sup> for that unit or branch bank will satisfactorily produce the Key A. If a person having access to Key A<sup>1</sup> at one branch goes to a different branch, where a different Key C is employed in the encryption algorithm 108, the Key A<sup>1</sup> from the first branch will not produce the Key A at the second branch. It is thus possible to limit the distribution of Key A to a very small, highly select group of people.

Encryption algorithm 106 thus produces as an output 32 binary digits having a predetermined relationship to the 32 bit input. These 32 output bits are divided into 6-5 bit words in a table conversion process 110 with only 30 bits being used. For instance, the words may be formed from the first 6 groups of five sequential bits each with the last two bits not being used. Each group of five bits is utilized in table conversion process 110 as an address word in accessing a table storing one decimal digit of value 1-9 at each address location. The table conversion thus results in 6 digits, each having a value of 1-9. These digits have a direct correspondence to the personal ID number and the digit 0 is excluded in order to avoid personal ID numbers which start with leading 0's and can be expected to create confusion or variable length entries.

If the information on the credit card is found to be in order, a user access panel is opened to provide user access to the optical user display and user keyboard 112. The user is directed to enter his personal ID number through the numeric field of the keyboard. If the user does not enter exactly six digits within a predetermined period of time, an incorrect ID number is assumed and a retry is suggested. Upon entry of exactly six digits, a portion or the whole of the entered ID number is optionally compared with the 6 digit number generated by table conversion 110. The key K2 indicates which of the six corresponding pairs of digits are to be compared.

In this example it has been assumed that K2=4 so that the three least significant digits having positions 4, 5 and 6 are compared by compare step 114. If the comparison is invalid, a faulty ID number is indicated and the user is invited to retry entry of the ID number. If the ID number is not properly entered in a given number of retries such as 3, the transaction request is terminated and a message is sent to the host. Upon host command the credit card is pre-

ferably transported to a retention bin to prevent further use of the credit card in random attempts to match an ID number with a possibly stolen credit card. Alternatively, a credit card may be returned to the user. Upon determination that the compared digits of the keyed ID number match the corresponding digits which were obtained from the credit card, the six digits of the personal ID number are converted to a 32 bit binary code at step 116. In step 116 the first 24 bits are obtained directly from the 6 entered digits. The last 8 bits or 1 byte is obtained by treating each sequential pair of four bit digits as a single byte and taking the successive "exclusive or" of corresponding bit positions in each of the resulting three bytes to obtain the data content of the corresponding bit position in the fourth byte. Other means of obtaining the last 8 bits of information are acceptable so long as the method results in variable information which is a function of all bits of the entered ID number. These 32 bits are then processed with an encryption algorithm 118 using Key A to produce a 32 bit encrypted personal ID number. The encryption algorithm 118 may in general be any suitable encryption algorithm, but for this example it will be presumed that it is identical to the encryption algorithm 106. Use of the same algorithm for both encryption processes permit use of the same stored program or hardware logic for both processes. The encryption key for algorithm 118 may also be in general any suitable key. However, for this example it is assumed that algorithm 118 utilizes Key A which is identical to the Key A utilized for algorithm 106. This multiple use of the same encryption key as well as the same encryption algorithm further reduces the complexity of the terminal 14 operation and the size of the required data storage. The 32 bits which result from encryption algorithm 118 thus represent an once encrypted personal ID number.

The 32 bits of the encrypted personal ID number are then converted in step 120 to 6 four bit digits with two four bit digits being dropped. In step 122 the two discarded digits are replaced by two four bit digits of variable data. This replacement of ID number derived information with variable information prevents the encrypted field from being a constant. In general the variable data may be any data which has no predetermined relationship to the personal ID number and which varies with each transaction request message. In this preferred embodiment, the variable data is a cash counter (CNTR) count for cash issue transactions and a transaction number (N) for other transactions.

The 32 bits which result from the combination of the six four bit digits and the 8

bits of variable data are then passed through an encryption algorithm 124 which utilizes a third encryption Key B. Encryption algorithm 124 may in general be any suitable encryption algorithm. But for this preferred embodiment it will be assumed that algorithm 124 is identical to algorithm 118, algorithm 106, and algorithm 108. Key B is a 64 bit encryption key which is received from the host data processing system 12 during initialization and which cannot be changed except by communication of a new key from the host data processing system. The encryption algorithm 124 results in 32 bits of encrypted data which are assembled in a transaction request message immediately behind the four byte common header as described previously.

After the compare step 114 at least partially validates the credit card, the user is instructed to indicate the transaction which he is requesting by use of the keyboard 112. The user is first instructed to indicate the type of transaction which is being requested and all of the back lights in the transaction request field of the keyboard are illuminated. As a particular key, which in this case would be the funds transfer key, is activated, the back light of the activated key remains illuminated while the back lights of all other keys in the field are extinguished. The user is then instructed to select the account from which funds are to be transferred and the back lights of all of the keys in the from account field are illuminated. As the user selects the from savings key the back light of that key remains illuminated while the back lights of all other keys in the from account field are extinguished. The user is then instructed to select the account to which the funds are to be transferred and all back lights in the to account field are illuminated. Upon selection of the checking account key, the activated key remains back lighted and the back lights of all other keys in the to account field are extinguished. The remaining back lights provide an audit trail so that a user may confirm or remind himself of the status of his transaction request entry. He can change his mind at any time by returning to a previously entered field activating a new key and continuing the keyboard entry process from that point. Numerical information such as the dollar amount of funds which are to be transferred is entered through the numeric field of keyboard 112. All entered numeric information is displayed for confirmation except the personal ID number. This number is not displayed in order to prevent surreptitious knowledge of the personal ID number by a person standing behind the user. The keyboard data, credit card data read from the magnetic stripe, and any desired additional data are then provided in clear text behind the four

byte common header field and four byte encrypted field. This information is then communicated to the host data processing system 14 as a transaction request message.

## 2. TRANSACTION REPLY MESSAGE

Referring now to Fig. 4 as a transaction request message is received by the host data processing system 12, it undergoes processing 140 to separate the various fields of data with the common header field being used for message routing and with the 32 encrypted bits being passed through a decrypt algorithm 142 and the clear text being received by the host data processor 144 which has a large data storage 146. The decrypt algorithm 142 uses Key B which is the same third or transmission key which was utilized for encryption algorithm 124. The host data processor 12 utilizes the clear text data to access the user's data base record (file) data storage 146. This file contains account data as well as information associated with the user's credit card such as the encrypted personal ID number (or numbers).

The 32 bits which are generated by decryption algorithm 142 are passed through a separation processor 148 wherein the 6 four bit digits of the encrypted personal ID number are separated from the two variable digits. A comparison 150 is then performed with the communicated 6 digits of the encrypted ID number being compared with the 6 digits of ID information from the file which were stored in encrypted form.

This encryption process greatly improves the security of cash stored in the various transaction terminals 14 which may be in communication with an on line host data processing system. A person of ill intent who is in possession of the correspondence between credit card account numbers and personal ID numbers could surreptitiously obtain cash from the terminal 14. For example, a person might forge or steal credit cards having information stored thereon which pertains to actual user accounts. Using the forged credit card and the corresponding personal ID number, a person could first inquire as to the balance of various savings, checking or other accounts which are accessible through the credit card. Having obtained the balance information, the person could then use the credit card and the cash issue terminal 14 to withdraw cash from those accounts until either the accounts or the terminal cash are depleted. Additional accounts with their credit card and corresponding personal ID number could be utilized in a similar manner until all of the cash at a cash issue terminal has been issued. The person could then move on to deplete the cash from additional cash issue terminals in the system using additional credit cards and personal ID numbers. Because each

cash terminal 14 may contain many thousands of dollars and because there may be many terminals 14 in communication with the host data processing system 12, it becomes extremely important to maintain the correspondence between credit card account numbers and personal ID numbers secured and yet permit local checks to allow higher availability of terminals 14 through off line use. It becomes extremely difficult for a person to obtain the correspondence between the credit card information and personal ID numbers for a large number of accounts when the techniques described herein are employed. Even if the personal ID number may be completely generated by passage of the stored credit card information through encryption algorithm 106, security of its encryption Key A is maintained as described above.

If the relationship of a portion (or preferably all), for example the first three digits, of the personal ID number and the stored credit card information has no predetermined relation, it becomes even more difficult to compromise the system. It is possible that personnel at the data processing center for the host data processing system 12 may have access to the stored encrypted ID number. However, the actual personal ID number is not stored in the host data processing system and the encrypted ID number is of no value in obtaining cash from a terminal 14 since it is the actual personal ID number that must be entered through the keyboard of a terminal 14. It is thus necessary for a person seeking to obtain the correspondence between a large number of credit cards and corresponding personal ID numbers to have access to both the encrypted personal ID numbers stored in the host data base and the decryption algorithm corresponding to encryption algorithm 118 and encryption Key A.

As credit cards are issued it is possible to limit the knowledge of the correspondence between credit card data and personal ID numbers to a very few people. In fact, accounts can be established with part of the personal ID number being derived from the credit card information, and part being randomly generated by a computer. The total personal ID number can then be printed and sealed in an envelope along with a credit card such that the personal ID number is available to human eyes only after the envelope is given to a prospective user as he opens a credit card account which can be processed by a terminal 14. It is thus possible to develop an assignment system wherein no banking personnel have access to the correspondence between credit card accounts and the associated personal ID number.

If the comparison 150 shows that the

stored and communicated encrypted personal ID numbers are not identical, the host data processing system assembles and communicates a transaction reply message indicating that execution of the transaction is not authorized. The transaction reply message might direct the requesting terminal 14 to either retain or return the user credit card. On the other hand, if the stored and communicated encrypted ID numbers are found to correspond, and if the requested transaction does not violate any predetermined rules which might relate to dollar amounts, rates of withdraw, or account balances, the transaction is authorized by a transaction reply message. The transaction reply message contains 32 bits of encrypted information corresponding to the 32 bits of encrypted information which are received in the transaction request message. In an assembling process 152, 32 bits are assembled for encryption with encryption algorithm 154 using Key B, which is the third, transmission encryption key. The encryption algorithm may in general be any suitable encryption algorithm but for this example it is assumed that the algorithm is identical to encryption algorithms 106, 118 and 124. It is further assumed that Key B is identical to the Key B for encryption algorithm 124. The 32 bits which are assembled for encryption are different from the communicated 32 bits which contained the 6 digits of encrypted ID number and two variable digits. The 32 bits of the transaction reply message include a one byte cash counter number corresponding to a first cash count (CNTR 1) maintained by a terminal 14 which is incremented for each bill issued, an action byte which indicates the response the terminal 14 is to take to the requested user transaction, a second cash counter byte (CNTR 2) identifying the cash count which is maintained for a second cash issue mechanism within the terminal 14 and an amount byte (AMT) which indicates the number of bills which is relevant to the requested transaction. These 32 bits are then processed through encryption algorithm 154 to form 32 encrypted bits 156. The encrypted bits 156 are then combined with clear text data such as optional display data, optional receipt data, or additional data required to complete the transaction and communicated back to the requesting terminal 46 and as a transaction reply message in step 158.

### 3. EXECUTION AND STATUS MESSAGE

As the transaction reply message is received by the terminal 14 the message undergoes input processing 160 to check for transmission accuracy and separate the reply message into its various fields. The encrypted field is passed through a decryption algorithm 162 which uses Key B to restore the 32 bits containing the cash counter one

(CNTR 1), ACTION, cash counter two (CNTR 2) and amount data (AMT). These bytes are checked for accuracy to ensure that the transaction reply message was received error free and that it corresponds to the correct transaction request message. A transaction conclusion 164 is then executed in accordance with the contents of the transaction reply message. In concluding a transaction, the terminal 14 returns or retains the credit card, issues appropriate documents such as cash or printed transaction statements, formally executes or cancels the transaction, displays appropriate messages to allow the user's approval or disapproval; and performs any additional transaction execution functions which are necessary for completion of the transaction.

Upon completion of a user requested transaction, the terminal 14 communicates a status message to the host data processing system 12 which informs the data processing system 12 of the manner in which the requested transaction was terminated and the status of the terminal 14. Preparation of the status message includes assembly 166 of 32 bits which are encrypted with encrypted algorithm 168 using Key B to generate 32 encrypted bits 170. The encryption algorithm 168 may in general be any suitable encryption algorithm but for the preferred embodiment presented herein, encryption algorithm 168 is identical to encryption algorithms 106, 108, 118, 124, and 154. Key B is identical to Key B for encryption algorithms 124 and 154. However, unlike Key A, Key B may be changed by the host data processing system 12 and it is anticipated that Key B would be changed from time to time. The 32 bits 170 undergo output processing 172 as they are combined with non-encrypted status information and transmitted as a status message from the transaction execution terminal 14 to the host data processing system 12.

The method of using encryption algorithms as described herein provides great security for the transaction execution system 10 without requiring the storage capacity for storing the multiple encryption programs. Furthermore, with the proper selection of the encryption and decryption algorithms, the decryption algorithm can be quite similar to the encryption algorithm to permit a double usage of most of the encryption algorithm program for both encryption and decryption. This results in a further savings of program storage requirements. The last encryption of the 32 bits of encrypted information in the three user transaction messages permits security of the encrypted ID number along the communication channel while permitting the same general format to be utilized for all three messages. In the transaction request message, assembly pro-

cess 122 combines the encrypted ID number with varying data to make it extremely difficult for a person monitoring the communication lines to break Key B and encryption algorithm 124 by repeatedly entering the same ID number, credit card and request and monitoring the corresponding encrypted communications. The transaction reply message contains a counter one byte, an action byte, a counter two byte and an amount. This information is all different from the encoded information of the transaction request message and also contains varying information. The amount and the action byte will tend to be the same for the same types of transaction request, however the control bytes will change. The 32 encrypted bits of the status message are different from the encrypted fields of either of the other two messages in that they contain the transaction number which is time varying, the counter two and counter one bytes in different byte positions from the transaction reply message and a count byte (CB) which indicates (via a binary count) the number of status and inquiry data bytes which follow the encrypted portion of the message for a normal status message. A status message which is generated in response to a transaction termination would normally contain no inquiry data byte. In the event that the status message is a "request recovery" type of exception status message, the third byte (CB) of the encryption field contains the "action" byte from the transaction reply message for the last request. Thus, by changing Key B from time to time and sending different information in the encrypted portion of each different type of message, the task of breaking the transmission encryption algorithm and finding the current Key B by monitoring the communication lines is made extremely difficult. Even if the transmission encryption algorithm and Key B were broken, monitoring the transmission of messages would produce a correspondence between accounts and encrypted personal ID numbers only for specific credit cards which are used while the communication is being monitored. The assembly of a large number of forged or stolen credit cards and corresponding personal ID numbers could be accomplished only by further breaking the Key A. In an alternative embodiment where there is a predetermined relationship between all digits of the personal ID number and information on the credit card, access to the data base is not necessary. Keys K1 and K2 of course provide further security for the encrypted ID number in the event that the local ID check option is implemented.

#### WHAT WE CLAIM IS:—

1. A controlled access system including testing means, a request station incorporat-

ing encoding means, a control station incorporating encoding means and a communication system for transmission of data between the request station, the control station and the testing means, the arrangement being such that a request for access includes the entry of two messages at the request station, one of which is encoded at the request station, the other being encoded at the control station, the testing means being arranged to generate an access enabling signal if there is correspondence between the encoded forms of the two messages.

2. A system as claimed in claim 1 wherein the testing means is located at the control station.

3. A system as claimed in claim 2 wherein the request station is incorporated in a data processing terminal and the testing means and control station are incorporated in a host data processor.

4. A system as claimed in claim 3 in which the data processing terminal is a transaction terminal dependent upon host processor for approval and recordation of transactions indicated by a user, the transaction terminal including a data input device for entering a user determined block of identification information; an encoder connected to encode at least a portion of the block of identification information to produce a first encrypted block of identification information indicative of at least a portion of the identification block of information; an encoder connected to encode at least a portion of the first encrypted block of identification information to produce a second encrypted block of identification information indicative of at least a portion of the identification block of information; and a transmission system arranged to feed at least a portion of the second encrypted block of identification information to the communication system for transmission to the host processor.

5. A system as claimed in claim 4 in which the terminal further includes a device for generating a block of variable information which changes with each user transaction and wherein the second encrypted block producing encoder is further connected to encode a block of variable information along with at least a portion of the first encrypted block of identification information to produce a second encrypted block of identification information indicative of both variable

information and at least a portion of the block of identification information.

6. A system as claimed in claim 4 in which the terminal further includes means for storing first and second encryption keys and wherein the first and second encoded blocks of information are produced in response to the first and second encryption keys respectively.

7. A system as claimed in claim 4 wherein the block of identification information is of a length less than a predetermined length and further comprising means for expanding a data block length connected to receive a short data block of a length less than a predetermined length from the data input device, expand the received data block to a predetermined length by adding characters which are dependent upon the data content of the short data block, and provide a data block which has been expanded to a predetermined length to the first encrypted block producing encoder.

8. A system as claimed in claim 7 above, wherein the expanding means expands a short block of data by adding characters which are generated from the process of taking the logical exclusive-or of selected portions of the short block of data.

9. A system as claimed in claim 4 in which the terminal further includes means for reading prerecorded information from a user produced card, an encoder connected to encode a selected portion of the prerecorded information read from a card to produce a block of encrypted card information, and a comparator connected to compare a selected portion of the block of identification information received by the data input device with a corresponding selected portion of the block of encrypted card information and indicate the identity or non-identity of the compared data.

10. A system as claimed in claim 9, the terminal further including means responsive to the identity or non-identity indication for inhibiting the transmission of said at least a portion of the second encrypted block to host.

11. A controlled access system substantially as hereinbefore described with reference to and as illustrated in the accompanying drawings.

I. M. GRANT,  
Chartered Patent Agent,  
Agent for the Applicants.





FIG. 1








FIG. 3




FIG. 4




FIG. 5

**This Page is Inserted by IFW Indexing and Scanning  
Operations and is not part of the Official Record**

**BEST AVAILABLE IMAGES**

Defective images within this document are accurate representations of the original documents submitted by the applicant.

Defects in the images include but are not limited to the items checked:

- ☐ **BLACK BORDERS**
- ☐ **IMAGE CUT OFF AT TOP, BOTTOM OR SIDES**
- ☐ **FADED TEXT OR DRAWING**
- ☐ **BLURRED OR ILLEGIBLE TEXT OR DRAWING**
- ☐ **SKEWED/SLANTED IMAGES**
- ☐ **COLOR OR BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPHS**
- ☐ **GRAY SCALE DOCUMENTS**
- ☐ **LINES OR MARKS ON ORIGINAL DOCUMENT**
- ☒ **REFERENCE(S) OR EXHIBIT(S) SUBMITTED ARE POOR QUALITY**
- ☐ **OTHER:** \_\_\_\_\_

**IMAGES ARE BEST AVAILABLE COPY.**

**As rescanning these documents will not correct the image problems checked, please do not report these problems to the IFW Image Problem Mailbox.**